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Since 2007, rhinoceros poaching in South Africa has been increasing, now averaging three rhinos 
per day. Protecting the remaining rhinos requires both a better understanding of the crime of rhino 
poaching and of anti-poaching strategies. Through a theoretical triangulation of routine activity 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979), rational choice (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), and situational crime prevention 
theories (Clarke, 1997), we aim to better understand the crime of rhino poaching and analyze 
whether and how situational prevention measures can alter the cost-benefit equation of potential 
offenders. We also pay attention to how the sociopolitical and economic context affects rhino 
poaching and its governance. This chapter presents the results of research relating to the rhino 
conservation model of the Balule Nature Reserve in South Africa. Our study is based on 
participatory observation in their anti-poaching program, as well as interviews with stakeholders 
and partners of the program. We examine the Balule Rhino Conservation Model’s organizational 
design and the counter-measures currently employed. This allows us to assess strengths and 
weaknesses of the model and provide recommendations for improvement, both for this case and for 
other anti-poaching contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
Wildlife trafficking, as a form of transnational environmental crime, is a lucrative illicit endeavor 
that is rivaled only by trafficking in arms, humans, and drugs. The illegal trade in wildlife, timber, 
and fish is worth approximately 10 to 15 billion US dollars annually (Braun 2012). Poaching of 
animals is a threat to the livelihood of local communities, which depend on wildlife tourism. In 
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2012, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton labeled poaching a national security threat (rather 
than a mere conservation issue) and advocated for more law enforcement training and expertise 
to stem the surge of poaching (Braun 2012; Rhino Mercy 2013). Undercover investigations have 
shown that the proceeds of wildlife poaching are currently financing terrorist organizations (e.g., 
Lord’s Resistance Army, Al Shabaab, see Kalron & Crosta 2013; Christy & Stenton 2015). Calls for 
integrated anti-poaching and wildlife trafficking approaches have led to the emergence of multi-
stakeholder initiatives and public-private partnerships (Johannesen & Skonhoft 2004; Poudyal, 
Rothley & Knowler, 2009; Hauck & Sweijd 1999). Despite these initiatives, the poaching of 
rhinos in South Africa continues unabated and is occurring through the use of increasingly 
sophisticated methods. In fact, poaching numbers have increased from a few per year to three a 
day.  
Poaching of rhinos and other species is influenced by different factors such as political instability 
in neighboring countries (e.g., Zimbabwe) (Baral 2013), public mismanagement resulting in 
persisting poverty and hyperinflation (Artz 2014), and a lack of other opportunities to earn a 
living (Kvinta 2014). Moreover, embassy employees traffic wildlife (products) in diplomatic 
shipments (Animal Rights Africa 2009) and the sport hunting community arranges illegal rhino 
hunts for trophies (Rademeyer 2012b). Prosecution and sentencing only started in the last 
couple of years; prior to this, wildlife criminals only received a proverbial slap on the wrist 
(Rademeyer 2012a). Organized crime syndicates operate largely undetected and undisturbed in 
South Africa, feeding the demand for wildlife products on the black market (Rademeyer, 2012c; 
Warchol, 2004). These poaching syndicates are a threat to rangers, tourists, and local 
inhabitants. Poaching threats also shift the tasks of wardens from pure conservationists and 
managers to quasi-law enforcement entities, necessitating a range of counter-measures both in 
Kruger National Park (KNP) and the neighboring private nature reserves. Most of these 
measures are costly, with the majority of funding coming from charities and donations. 
The significant rise in poaching has led to discussion among conservationists, and law 
enforcement and government institutions about preferred anti-poaching measures. Some have 
suggested a shoot-to-kill policy concerning suspected poachers (Leader-Williams & Milner-
Gulland, 1993; Messer 2000, 2010; DeFranza, 2010), whereas others support the legalization of 
the rhino horn trade and flooding of the market with horns from stockpiles (Sharife, 2013; 
Ammann, 2013; Biggs, Courchamp, Martin, & Possingham, 2013; Sills, 2013). Protecting the 
remaining rhinos definitely requires a better understanding of poaching and of anti-poaching 
strategies. To this end, this study explores a conservation model put in place at Balule Nature 
Reserve, a medium-sized reserve in the Greater Kruger National Park (GKNP) in South Africa. 
Through a theoretical triangulation of routine activity (Cohen & Felson, 1979), rational choice 
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(Cornish & Clarke, 1986), and situational crime prevention theories (Clarke, 1997), we aim to 
better understand the crime of rhino poaching and analyze whether and how situational 
prevention measures can alter the cost-benefit equation for potential offenders. 
This research begins with a literature review on wildlife crimes in both green and environmental 
criminology. Following this is a methodological description of the case study. We then use 
routine activity, rational choice, and situational crime prevention theories to analyze the causes 
of rhino poaching. Whereas this etiological question is answered with regard to all rhino 
habitats, the following section focuses specifically on the Balule Nature Reserve case study. We 
pay attention to the sociopolitical context, make a poaching risk assessment for the reserve, 
discuss the organizational design of the multi-stakeholder anti-poaching initiative, and analyze 
what situational prevention measures exist. The discussion outlines several strengths and 
weaknesses of the conservation model, which inform recommendations for improving the Balule 
conservation model and other anti-poaching contexts provided in the subsequent section. The 
conclusion discusses this case study in the broader context of environmental crime.  
2. Literature review 
2.1. Wildlife crime and green/conservation criminology 
Humanity’s unsustainable use of natural resources has led to the extinction of species and the 
pollution of ecosystems (Oskamp 2000; South, Brisman, & Beirne, 2013). Causes can be found in 
historical and cultural developments or traditions, as well as acts of negligence by corporate and 
government entities (Faure, 2009). Not all environmentally harmful acts are criminalized, 
especially when powerful actors such as governments or corporations lobby to spare certain 
groups of perpetrators from prosecution (White 2011). There is no doubt that wildlife crime and 
rhino poaching are criminal acts that are harmful to society and to animals themselves. Hence, 
wildlife poaching and trafficking are core topics within green and conservation criminology 
(Gibbs, Gore, McGarrell, & Rivers III, 2009; White 2011; Wyatt 2009).  
The notion of harm is not as straightforward for wildlife crime as for crimes of theft or physical 
harm committed in human vs. human relationships (Beirne & South 2007). Undoubtedly, these 
animals experience tremendous suffering, harm, and loss of life at the hands of wildlife 
criminals. However, they are not legally considered victims and are regarded as property rather 
than individuals. The victimization is transferred to present and future populations of humans, 
who will lose these iconic animals through extinction. Also, income from ecotourism connected 
to this particular species must be considered. The anthropocentric definition of harm has been 
criticized (Beirne 2013; Sollund 2013) because juxtaposing animals and humans implies that 
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“they were different in aspects which are important in attributing rights or capacities such as 
intelligence, sentience and morals and the ability to feel pain and pleasure” (Sollund, 2013, p. 2). 
Lacking a comprehensive term for humans killing animals, Beirne (2013, p.63) coined the term 
“theriocide.” The current state of affairs concerning rhino poaching is far from recognizing rights 
of these animals. Species justice is not in place yet and may come as “too little, too late” for some 
non-human species, including rhinos.  
In our study, wildlife crime is defined as “the taking, trading, exploiting, or possessing of the 
world’s wild flora and fauna […] in contravention of national and international laws” (Interpol, 
2010). This definition aligns with the Convention on International Trade on Endangered Species 
of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) and South Africa’s domestic criminal environmental laws. 
Taking into account that CITES is not a legal document per se but is designed and intended to 
promote national legislation, rhino poaching is considered a national crime violating South 
African legislation. Which South African law applies depends on the location of the crime, but the 
country nonetheless considers rhino poaching a criminal act. While national legislation applies 
to national parks and other protected areas, private game farms fall under local environmental 
management acts. The laws relevant for Balule Nature Reserve list restricted activities, one of 
which is poaching. Possible penalties are prison sentences up to ten years and/or a fine of up to 
10,000,000 ZAR (approximating EUR 636,000 or USD 716,000, see The Law Library, 2014). The 
key words here are “up to,” at least regarding fine amounts. Rhino poachers can also be charged 
with violations under the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 and its subsidiary legislation of 2004. 
The sentence can be a fine or a prison term between 2 and 25 years, but statistics concerning its 
application have not been released since the act came into force (The Law Library, 2014).  
Although we use a legalistic definition of poaching, we also pay attention to the harmful 
consequences of poaching at a social and economic level. South Africa’s tourism industry, which 
supports one in every twelve jobs, largely depends on the visibility and existence of wildlife in 
its territory (Brand South Africa 2012). If poaching continues to threaten wildlife in South Africa 
and to compromise the safety of visitors, employment opportunities in the tourism industry and 
related fields (e.g., the security sector, restaurant and food supplies, arts and crafts, car rental) 
will decrease. This would result in South Africa losing a substantial portion of its annual gross 
domestic product.   
2.2. Wildlife crime and environmental criminology 
The Chicago school of research in sociology and criminology coined the term “environmental 
criminology.” In this case, environmental means that research focuses on the spatial, contextual, 
and immediately-surrounding situational factors that can influence criminal activities. In this 
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approach, the environment does not refer to nature, and environmental criminology does not 
necessarily focus on environmental harm. When this situation-focused approach emerged, it 
shifted criminological attention away from the offender to the context. The realization followed 
that measures altering the situation may be suitable to prevent the crime. These approaches are 
mostly used in understanding and preventing street crimes such as burglary and car theft. More 
recently, they have been applied to wildlife crimes such as parrot poaching and illegal fishing 
(Pires & Clarke, 2012; Pires & Moreto, 2011; Clarke & De By, 2013; Petrossian 2012, 2014). The 
situational focus is therefore not new, but is rather being applied to a new topic.  
We use situational crime prevention theory (SCPT) to better understand the factors influencing 
rhino poaching and to evaluate the measures employed at Balule Nature Reserve. SCPT builds on 
routine activity (Cohen & Felson, 1979) and rational choice theories (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) 
and stresses the importance of the immediate environment and available opportunities in 
offender decision-making.  
In line with routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), we examine rhino poaching as a 
direct-contact crime of commission, as offenders display brutality, cruelty, and violence. Crime is 
considered to occur with the convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and an 
absence of available and capable guardians. The motivation of the offender is accepted as a 
given. Value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility enable assessment of the suitability of the target. 
Guardians can be anyone (not just governments) and may be absent in fact or in perception. This 
theory has been successfully applied to better explain and understand the phenomenon of 
(sustenance) poaching. Herbig and Warchol (2011) used routine activity theory to examine 
rhino poaching, and thereby contributed to understanding of why game reserves and protected 
areas are continuously violated by poachers. 
In line with rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2003; Clarke 2000; Cohen 2000), we 
analyze offenders’ cost-benefit analysis against situational influences. This analysis assumes that 
offenders are reasoning individuals who weigh perceived risk, anticipated effort, and potential 
rewards of a crime. When illegal means are the most suitable route of action, they start 
searching for opportunities.  
Situational crime prevention theory assumes that, despite unidentified offenders, reducing 
opportunities will lead to a decrease in crime. SCPT suggests that a variety of measures can alter 
the perceived risk, anticipated effort, and potential reward within the offender’s cost-benefit 
analysis. These measures are seemingly simple and practical (Cornish, 1994, p. 153), but must 
be tailored to the crime and the context (Cornish & Clarke 1987). SCPT has been successfully 
applied to wildlife crime and poaching in particular (Clarke & De By, 2013; Pires & Clarke, 2012; 
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Pires & Moreto, 2011). Huisman and van Erp (2013) applied SCPT to environmental white-collar 
crime and found it useful for identifying opportunity structures. However, they noted that SCPT 
should not be considered a panacea for all environmental crimes, because it was designed to 
combat crimes of commission. In contrast, many environmental crimes are crimes of omission 
(e.g., waste crime).  
With this triangulated theoretical approach, we hope to increase understanding of rhino 
poaching, while also providing a more complete picture than is available when looking only at 
the situational context and prevention methods at the chosen nature reserve.  
3. Method 
The field research was performed at Balule Nature Reserve in the Maruleng municipality of the 
Limpopo Province of northeast South Africa. This medium-sized private reserve with 
approximately 500 square kilometers of bush is located on the western edge of the GKNP area. 
The land was previously used for cattle farms, which were replaced by game reserves and 
hunting concessions in 2006 and transformed to the nature reserve in 2013. White South 
Africans and foreign landowners are the exclusive owners. 
The reserve is home to the “big five”3 and many animal populations traverse the area. Timbavati 
Nature Reserve and Klaserie Nature Reserve border the reserve, which then tie into Kruger 
National Park (KNP) further to the east. All these reserves are fenceless on their borders with 
each other and KNP. This benefits wildlife movement and the ecosystem. At the same time, this 
is a challenge for anti-poaching projects because there is no marking of old fence lines, resulting 
in easy crossing of jurisdictional boundaries, requiring cooperation between different anti-
poaching entities, and coordination of joint operations.  
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Figure 1. Map of Balule Nature Reserve Subsections (© S. Bosman, 2014) 
 
As shown in Figure 1, Balule Nature Reserve is currently divided into nine management sections: 
Parsons (PNR), Olifants North (ONNR), Gritjie (GNR), Olifants East (OENR), Olifants River 
(ORNR), Olifants West (OWNR), York (YNR), Mohlabetsi River (MRNR), and Mohlabetsi South 
(MSNR). For each subsection, one warden coordinates conservation, reserve, and tourism 
management efforts as well as anti-poaching measures and reports to the Head Warden of 
Balule Nature Reserve. 
Poachers have targeted Balule Nature Reserve itself and the surrounding areas. After identifying 
a need for a comprehensive response, Olifants West Nature Reserve (OWNR) in partnership with 
Rhino Mercy, TransFrontier Africa (TA), Pro-Track, Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT), and South 
African National Parks (SANParks) created a local initiative to counter poaching threats. OWNR 
is the region that has spearheaded the anti-poaching policy in Balule (see further), which is why 
participant observation took place at this region. 
To evaluate the Balule conservation, this case study combined participatory observation and 
interviews, which allowed the gaining of context-specific insights (Yin 2009). Six weeks of field 
research provided the opportunity to directly observe and participate in the Balule conservation 
model on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, 28 interviews were conducted with people directly 
involved in this collaborative multi-stakeholder initiative. The interviews intended to identify 
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perceptions of risk and challenges for stakeholders in their respective area, examine what 
measures are employed, and determine whether and how they respond to situational needs. 
These respondents were selected through purposeful sampling. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the respondents and their expertise. The semi-structured interviews were tailored to the 
respective stakeholders. The respondents gave informed consent for their information and 
names to be included in this study. The interviews by the Armed Response and Tactical Unit as 
well as the Black Mamba APU were handled confidentially. The interview data was cross-
referenced with field notes and documents collected throughout the six-week participatory 
observation. 
Table 1: List of Respondents 
Respondent Organization Experience or function Interview date(s) 
Tom Tochterman Rhino Mercy CEO of Rhino Mercy, Researcher, and 
PhD Candidate in Environmental 
Leadership 
January 16 & 30, 
2014; February 6, 
2014; March 2, 2014 
Craig Spencer Balule Nature 
Reserve -Olifants 
West (OWNR) 
Head Warden Balule Nature Reserve 
and Warden Olifants West Nature 
Reserve, Researcher and Lecturer of 
Conservation and Ecology, Wildlife-
Anti-poaching Police background 
January 17 & 24, 
2014; February 20, 
2014; March 3, 2014 
Stefan Bosman Balule Nature 
Reserve–Olifant 
West (OWNR) 
Assistant Warden Olifants West 
Nature Reserve and Coordinator 
Rhino Monitoring 
January 18 & 31, 
2014; February 24, 
2014 
Cornell Vermaak Balule Nature 
Reserve–Parson 
(PNR) 
Warden of Parsons Nature Reserve January 27, 2014 
Rian Ahlers Balule Nature 
Reserve - Joint 
Operation Center 
(YNR) 
Chief of JOC and Warden of York 
Nature Reserve 
February 13 & 27, 
2014 
Staff Black Mamba Anti-
Poaching Unit (APU) 
Day to Day Anti-poaching Operations January 22, 2014; 
February 12 & 28, 
2014 
Staff Armed Response 
and Tactical Unit 
Security and Anti-Poaching January 23, 2014; 
March 1, 2014 
Vincent Barkas Pro-Track Security Operations, CEO of Pro-Track, 
23 years of anti-poaching experience 
January 20, 2014; 
February 5, 2014 
Staff Pro-Track Military background, day to day anti-
poaching operations 
January 18, 2014; 
February 26, 2014 
Coert Joordan SANParks–Lawyer Legal Counsel for SANParks, mainly in 
Poaching trials 
January 31, 2014 
Allison Thomson Outraged South 
African Citizens 
Against Poaching 
(OSCAP) 
OSCAP spokeswoman February 3, 2014 
Kirsty Brebner Endangered 
Wildlife Trust 
(EWT) 
Rhino Project Manager February 4, 2014 
Dr. Lorinda Hern Rhino Rescue Lecturer at University of Pretoria and February 5, 2014 
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Program (RRP) Founder of Rhino Rescue Project and 
Rhino&Lion Reserve 
Lauren Saad Ezulwini Game 
Lodges 
Tourism Entrepreneur and Lodge 
Manager 
February 15, 2014 
This study did not aim to show whether the employed measures were effective because they 
have not been in place from a sufficiently long time. However, our analysis indicates the 
measures that appear to be more promising than others. For confidentiality and precaution, we 
do not reveal data about Balule’s rhino population, manpower, deployment, picket sites, and 
tactical setups. Revealing such information would not only breach confidentiality but also 
jeopardize the success of the program. The findings of this case study are specific to Balule 
Nature Reserve. The spatial conditions for this reserve are unique, but similarly to other 
contexts, poaching threats and counter-measures may change. With mindfulness of these 
limitations, our findings still allow reflection on anti-poaching and conservation in other 
settings.  
4. Findings on the Etiology of Rhino-poaching  
In what follows, we discuss findings regarding the etiology of rhino poaching, using the criteria 
of routine activity, rational choice, and situational crime prevention theories. 
4.1. Rhinos and Routine Activities 
In line with routine activity theory, we assess the suitability of rhinos as a target based on four 
criteria: visibility, accessibility, value, and inertia (Cohen & Felson 1979).  
The visibility depends on the size of the property and the size of the population: ten rhinos are 
much less likely to be visible on a reserve of 25,000 hectares than on a small game farm of 250 
hectares. The habitat also impacts the visibility: while African white rhinos are grazers, 
inhabiting lower plains and grassy savannahs, African black rhinos are browsers and prefer 
wooded, rocky mountain terrains. This makes the white rhino easier to spot. Other determining 
factors are the location of the reserve, the presence of communities within the reserve, the rhino 
population density, the number of water sources on the reserve, and the regularity of animal 
migration to these water sources.  
Accessibility is both factual and perceived. At present, private game reserves are usually 
guarded, yet widely accessible to the public. Their purpose is to stay connected to their 
surroundings. Lodge operators, tourists, building and maintenance contractors, and family and 
friends of personnel on the reserve generally have access to Balule and thus access to the 
animals as well. This is further increased with self-drive safaris, because potential offenders 
engage in reconnaissance before actually committing poaching crimes. The scouting of a 
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potentially suitable target may very well happen during the day and through legal access to a 
reserve. Accessibility is closely connected to guardianship or lack thereof, once again both 
factual and perceived (Cohen & Felson 1979). Guardians are not solely governmental actors, but 
can be anyone. It is in the interest of reserves to extend their guardianship as much as possible 
to prevent poaching. Technology and improved training regimes can enhance guardian 
capabilities tremendously and can ease the workload of existing guardians. Accessibility also 
refers to the number of game drives and anti-poaching unit patrols, as well as animal migration 
to waterholes as routinely occurring activities that can be used by poachers to plan crime. In 
sum, rhinos are very accessible in the current poaching crisis, either through legal or illegal 
means.  
A black market rhino horn is priced at EUR 50,000 or USD 56,000 per kilogram (Rhinomercy, 
2014). The inertia of rhino horns as a target is fairly low due to the fact that, at an average 
weight of 4 kg and average seize of 50 to 90 cm per horn, they are easily concealed and 
transported (The International Rhino Foundation, 2010). 
Routine activity theory helps explain rhino poaching. Offender motivation may be hard to assess 
or influence, but target suitability and the absence of capable guardians are more malleable. This 
does not mean that rhino poaching can be designed out of its environment entirely, but rather 
that the numbers of perceived opportunities for this crime may be reduced. 
4.2. Rhinos and Rational Choices 
In line with rational choice theory, we analyzed offenders’ cost-benefit analyses of perceived 
risk, anticipated effort, and potential reward of rhino poaching (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2003). 
The anticipated effort can be found in the time needed to plan, prepare, and perform the crime. 
Time and money are both required to gain access to weapons, a vehicle, and other equipment, 
the time needed to locate a rhino, the actual time the offender will have to spend on foot in a 
reserve, and endure hardships before and after the crime. Anticipated effort also entails gaining 
access to a reserve and exiting it with the rhino horn by legal or illegal means (e.g., climbing or 
cutting a fence). The resources, time, and energy invested in gathering intelligence, information, 
and skills (shooting a weapon, tracking animals, survival in harsh conditions, decoy techniques) 
needed to perform the crime count as well.  
Perceived risk is the second element. A potential offender performs reconnaissance and adjusts 
his risk perception accordingly. When the risk is perceived too high, the potential offender may 
be deterred, switching to a less-risky crime or to a softer target (e.g., a less guarded area). 
Intrinsic risk factors (risk of physical harm) vary for each reserve and depend on the amount of 
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visible guardianship (manpower), barriers (fence or wall), technology, potentially dangerous 
animals, and reserve size. Extrinsic risk factors (risks of legal repercussions) are the certainty, 
severity, as well as the swiftness of punishment, the legal classification (misdemeanor or felony) 
of the act, and whether it is perceived as immoral by society. For rhino poaching and other 
environmental crimes, the perceived risk with regard to certainty, severity, and celerity of 
punishment is low (Faure, 2009). It is only in recent years that offenders have occasionally 
received substantial jail time (Rademeyer, 2012). Respondent Coert Joordan assessed that “only 
20% of poaching dockets result in trials, because of faulty paperwork, lacking chain of custody 
and an overburdened court system.” Public shame is also limited as the widely-publicized rhino 
poaching trial against the Dawie Groenewald gang is still pending, despite the arrest dating back 
to September 2010 (Financial Transparency Coalition, 2013). Moreover, rhino poaching is often 
classified as a less serious offense with pre-trial bail creating the perception that rhino poaching 
is permissible. Respondent Kirsty Brebner confirmed that “certain parts of South African society 
see a rhino as “just an animal,” especially in contrast with other forms of crimes that are 
rampant.” 
The third and last element is expected reward, which can be very different from the actual 
reward received, especially for first-time offenders. Repeat offenders can anticipate this better 
and might look for markets prior to committing their crimes. This perceived reward is the 
money they expect to receive and how that will make it possible to buy things they could 
otherwise never achieve through legal means. Arrests in Balule have made clear that low-level 
poaching groups can earn up to 360,000 ZAR (approximately EUR 23,000 or USD 26,000) for 
each horn (4 kg), for a group of 4 or 5 poachers. Putting it into perspective, this means that each 
poacher earns over four times the annual income of a domestic worker. The expected reward is 
also influenced by how rare the horn is. With rhinos on the brink of extinction, rhino horn is 
likely to become more valuable.  
5. Findings on the Balule Rhino Conservation Model 
In what follows, we assess the governance characteristics of our case. First, the sociopolitical 
context is discussed. Next, the organization and management of the Balule Rhino Conservation 
Model multi-stakeholder framework is analyzed. The article continues by discussing the 
measures in place at Balule Nature Reserve to counter rhino poaching. The measures employed 
at the site of research for this study will be classified within the table of situational crime 
prevention measures (Table 2). 
5.1. Sociopolitical Context 
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In 2011, the Balule Rhino Conservation Model was developed to counter the anticipated 
displacement of poaching incidents from Kruger National Park, which had increased security. 
This was further influenced by the introduction of a population of black rhinos to Balule Nature 
Reserve as part of the Black Rhino Range Expansion Project (BRREP) of the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF). This project aims to increase the black rhino population through the creation of new 
populations (World Wildlife Fund, n.d.). Since September 2013, the Balule Rhino Conservation 
Model has been fully operational in the Olifants West region of the reserve.  
The Balule Model is a unique type of public-private partnership for South Africa because it 
involves governmental stakeholders as well as domestic and international non-governmental 
organizations, non-profit organizations, and private security stakeholders. Its uniqueness lies 
also in its ambition to change the existing socioeconomic disparities within the local community, 
in addition to threat response measures and anti-poaching efforts. The Balule governance model 
aims to create social change and community involvement, because effective long-term wildlife 
protection requires local communities experiencing the benefits of wildlife. The model generates 
local ownership and job opportunities for formerly disadvantaged communities, creating a 
vested interest in the survival of wildlife in general and rhinos in particular.  
Despite South Africa being among the most prosperous African democracies, its sociopolitical 
and economic situation is one where white people enjoy the majority of wealth, while most black 
people live in poverty (Conway-Smith, 2014). Respondent Vincent Barkas explains this fact as 
follows: “[S]ince colonial times, wildlife and nature reserves as well as hunting concessions have 
been regarded as ‘the white man’s playground and toys’.” This comment illustrates the 
remaining cultural divide. The average person from an indigenous community has never been 
able to enjoy wildlife, much less benefit from its existence, other than for food (Bracken & 
Barkas, 2013). The environmental monitors employed in the Black Mamba Anti-Poaching Unit 
(see below) have also supported this claim during their interviews: “[W]e never had the 
opportunity to view, photograph or experience wildlife prior to working for [the] Balule [Rhino 
Conservation Model]. In collaboration with the Kruger2Canyon Biosphere, SANParks, and the 
National Department of Environmental Affairs (K2C Environmental Monitors 2013), the Balule 
Rhino Conservation Model not only recruits Environmental Monitors from local disadvantaged 
populations, but also establishes initiatives such as Green Kidz to directly involve local children 
in wildlife conservation activities, spark their interest, and educate them about the importance 
of conservation” (Brassett, 2014). Their Environmental Monitors are also sent out to local 
schools and villages as Wildlife Ambassadors, thereby creating new learning opportunities. 
Moreover, in collaboration with lodges and tourism providers on the reserve, they invite local 
13 
 
schoolchildren on game drives, bush walks, wildlife activities and even rhino collaring, providing 
them with unforgettable experiences. 
5.2. Poaching Risk Assessment for Balule Nature Reserve 
The western and northern boundaries of Balule Game Reserve are marked by a fence of 25 
kilometers with different access gates. This fence stands next to Route 40, a tar road between 
Hoedspruit and Phalaborwa with heavy mining traffic. The fence is mainly designed to keep 
animals in, not to keep people out. From the road, poachers might spot animals or look for 
weaknesses in the fence. The eastern boundary is completely unfenced and game migrates in 
and out of the area according to their needs. In the south, Balule is bordered by Tshukudu Game 
Reserve and separated from it with a fence.  
Interviewee Rhian Ahlers explained that “the Olifants River and a railroad line [towards the 
mines] intersect the reserve and both are known to be used as points of entry for poachers.” 
Suspected poachers are nearly impossible to track as they can easily mask their spoor both in 
the river and on railroad tracks. Trains transport cargo only, but at certain points they are slow 
enough for a person to jump on. 
Hoedspruit is the closest town. It has about 3500 inhabitants, a high unemployment rate (40 per 
cent), persisting poverty, and 21 per cent of people over 20 years have no education (Yes! Media, 
2012). A small number of indigenous people live on Balule Nature Reserve land and some of 
them work for lodges or private landowners. Some indigenous people employed on the reserve 
have set snares and cages, which threaten all wildlife due to their indiscriminate nature. 
Respondent Craig Spencer assessed that “sustenance poachers never know nor care which 
animal is caught.” Vincent Barkas added that “bush meat harvesting happens both because of 
local tradition and tribal culture, and for sustenance given the poverty and unemployment, 
despite [the fact] that the reserve is not considered tribal land and is not contested as such.”  
Another risk element is the availability of firearms. Although these are generally stored at every 
game lodge and farm, the control of weapons is fairly lenient and every game ranger has access. 
“Local farms outside of the reserve have also been robbed for their firearms (hunting rifles), 
which often reappear in poaching incidents,” according to interviewee Craig Spencer. Moreover, 
guests can bring weapons to the reserve if they comply with South African legislation and have a 
valid permit.  
5.3. Organizational Model 
The Balule Rhino Conservation Model is organized as a pyramid, as represented in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Balule Rhino Conservation Model 
 
The Environmental Monitors play an integral role as visible patrols and “boots on the ground” 
within the reserve. This was initially meant to create jobs for disadvantaged groups and had the 
additional benefit of addressing poaching and other environmental threats (K2C Environmental 
Monitors 2013). Environmental Monitors are included in the overall anti-poaching strategy and 
are mainly young women. By offering disadvantaged communities prestigious employment in an 
industry they historically never had access to, they earn a sustainable income, build a skill set 
through accredited training, and can expect to receive more responsibility in the future. Craig 
Spencer explained that “the standard training is in hand-to-hand combat, search and seizure, 
arrest and court procedures, creation of statements and dockets, handling and chain of custody 
of evidence, road blocks and gate operations, legislation, snake handling, alien vegetation 
removal, snare detection and removal, weapons handling, safety and certification.” This results 
in gaining security clearance. It is hoped that employing women will lead to their appreciation 
for wildlife and conservation being passed down to their children. Albeit a long-term goal, 
changing perceptions about wildlife are an integral part of the governance model. The 
government’s initial plan proposed 1000 environmental monitors to be trained and paid by 
SANparks (South African Department of Environmental Affairs, 2014). Within Balule, the aim is 
to increase the number of Environmental Monitors to one per 1000 acres, but currently only 
Olifants West Region has them, represented by the Black Mamba Anti-Poaching Unit. The Black 
Mambas initially consisted of four females and three males, all of whom were formerly 
unemployed, but now on average sustain six people as sole breadwinners. They work on 21 day 
rotating schedule, receiving room, board, and apparel in staff compounds on the reserve and ten 
days of leave, spent in their home communities. Recently, the Black Mambas received national 
and international attention and recognition for their work. They were distinguished with the 
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South African Best Conservation Practitioner Award4 and the United Nations Environmental 
Program’s Champions of the Earth award5. 
The second level of the pyramid is the Pro Track Armed Response Team, which responds to 
detections from the Environmental Monitors and to other intelligence concerning poaching and 
incursion threats. Created in 1992, this was the first private anti-poaching unit in South Africa 
and is currently the largest (Pro Track, 2011). This team lives in very basic accommodation and 
is permanently located within the reserve on a rotational basis to reduce incident response time. 
Vincent Barkas claims that, “[i]n line with Pro-Track’s socially responsible vision, training and 
work happens in groups of mixed ethnicity, which is a change from the norm. Especially for 
black people this qualified training program is a possibility for upward development they 
seldom have access to.” Contrary to Kruger NP and many law enforcement and even 
conservation agencies, where the success rate of operations is often measured by how many 
poachers are shot, Pro Track believes a shoot to kill policy brings more harm than good. “Every 
time you shoot a poacher, you take away a provider from a community and, therefore, 
antagonize the rest of that very same community, due to shooting one of their own,” Vincent 
Barkas stated. It is also illegal for private security employees to use lethal force for suspected 
poachers, unless facing a threat to their life. Also, for every casualty, several others are willing to 
fill in, given the monetary rewards. Moreover, use of lethal force voids the possibility of 
intelligence gathering at the source to find the middlemen within poaching syndicates. This does 
not always work, because, similarly to international wildlife trafficking syndicates, poachers on 
the ground engage in division of labor and knowledge and have become more organized and 
sophisticated in recent years.  
The Joint Operation Center is at the top of the pyramid and serves the entire reserve. This two-
person team coordinates all operations, collaborates with neighboring reserves’ anti-poaching 
coalitions, and collects, evaluates, and disseminates outside intelligence about poaching threats. 
They also manage the intelligence network of informants and independently investigate 
reported poaching threats outside of the reserve’s borders. It is a regional center of expertise to 
counter poaching threats (Rhino Mercy, 2013). Their main challenge is incident response time, 
given the absence of (expensive) air support, and surveillance (e.g., drones) to direct ground 
troops to suspected poachers.  
5.4. Situational prevention measures at Balule 
                                                             
4 http://www.hi-tec.com/uk/blog/black-mambas-win-best-conservation-practitioner-at-the-rhino-
conservation-awards.html  
5 http://web.unep.org/champions/laureates/2015/black-mamba-apu  
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The Balule Rhino Conservation Model employs reactive and proactive threat response measures 
and measures to safeguard the integrity of the program and its employees. We discuss each of 
these measures and provide a summary table at the end of this section. 
The first reactive measure is hotspot and buffer zone patrol. Green intelligence (referring to 
range and terrain preferences of rhinos) combined with red intelligence (referring to the 
analysis of intrusions’ port of entry and distance traveled) allows the identification of hotspots 
where the location of assets, reserve weaknesses, and (unknown) intruders converge. This is in 
line with routine activity theory. Rian Ahlers explained that in Balule, “two types of hotspots 
exist: poaching hotspots where the threatened animal is located and intrusion hotspots due to 
vulnerabilities of the location itself.” These hotspots need increased management and control, 
although available resources currently do not allow covering all hotspots. To relieve some 
poaching pressure for the reserve, a 24-hour standby tactical unit of Pro Track responds to 
threats inside and outside the reserve’s boundaries. This creates buffer zones and drives threats 
further away or intercepts them before reaching the reserve. Hotspot patrolling and buffer zone 
patrolling, both intelligence-led policing strategies, are ways to supply formal surveillance 
geared toward situations on the ground (Clarke, 1997, p. 18).  
The second reactive measure is Environmental Monitors (Black Mamba Anti-Poaching Unit), 
who serve both as a visual policing component and a patrol within the reserve. They patrol the 
fence and buffer zone, assist in gate operations and roadblocks, remove snares and alien 
vegetation, and relay all gathered information to their commanding officer. This is a measure of 
surveillance through employees (Clarke, 1997) and extending the guardianship (Cohen & Felson, 
1979) of the reserve. UNEP reported that the presence and operations of Black Mambas had 
reduced snaring by 75%, made poaching numbers plummet, and led to several arrests. 
Furthermore, UNEP mentioned community empowerment and environmental education as 
reasons they received the award.  
The third reactive measure is the support of a K9 unit within Black Mambas. The four-year-old 
Belgian Malinois Shaya is trained to detect weapons, ammunition, ivory, and rhino horn. He 
assists with crime scene processing and gate operations on a regular basis and is dispatched to 
neighboring properties for assistance. Shaya was trained in Germany by the non-profit Rettet 
das Nashorn and the Hessen police and later donated to the Balule Nature Reserve. His handler, 
Craig Spencer, proudly shared that “Shaya’s record so far consists of the successful detection of 
eight weapons, 112 rounds of ammunition and a variety of other poaching equipment, like 
machetes and silencers.” His presence at the gates serves as a natural deterrent for potential 
offenders. The use of a detection dog serves a dual purpose in situational prevention: simplifying 
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control by detecting poaching facilitators, such as weapons and ammo, and removing crime 
benefits by detecting rhino horn and ivory before both leave the reserve, leading to judicial 
proceedings and possibly punishment.  
The first proactive measure is VHF (using radio frequency) and GPS (using satellites) collaring, 
which is used to follow rhinos (e.g., through GIS mapping). This green intelligence is a 
conservation monitor and anti-poaching measure, providing information on habitat use, range 
and terrain preferences and allowing anti-poaching entities to locate assets in the field, 
anticipate hot spots, and deploy their forces accordingly. GPS collars send an alarm when it is 
immobile for a longer period, i.e., when either the collar is lost or an animal is sick, dead, or 
killed. GPS collars are also used as a geofence, meaning that an alarm is sent as soon as animals 
cross a set boundary (e.g., a hot spot). Collaring requires immobilization, but other tests such as 
blood samples, parasite checks, ear notches for identification, pregnancy test, and health and 
welfare assessment are performed at the same time. 
The second proactive measure is motion-triggered camera traps, which are placed on 
waterholes, roads, and others. These traps transmit pictures to cellphones of the chief of the 
Joint Operations Center, the warden, and the assistant warden of the respective section. This is 
also a conservation monitor (waterhole use, migration) and remote anti-poaching measure. 
Threat response can be immediate, conditional on cellphone coverage, and happens without 
perpetrators’ knowledge. Response time is an issue because of the vast territory. 
The third proactive measure is the rhino horn alteration in the form of (pink) dye infusion 
(Rhino Rescue Project 2012). Balule Nature Reserve was the first to treat their population of 
rhinos using this method when it became available in 2011. In this method, a microchip is 
inserted into the horn, which allows tracking a rhino for the growth period of the horn (3–4 
years). The rhino is immobilized for 45 min, but at the same time, a DNA sample is taken for the 
national Rhodis database. Rhino horn alteration requires warning signs (in Chinese, English, 
Tsonga, and Zulu) about the treatment and its adverse effects. Critics think that this can lead 
poachers to shoot another rhino when they discover the pink horn of their previous kill. Others 
refer to the possible displacement and the poisoning of rhino horn consumers (Rhino Rescue 
Project 2012). In combination with other measures, rhino horn alteration is still a very visible 
form of policing. Lorinda Hern explained that currently “other horn alteration methods are 
explored such as radioactive isotopes, which would allow detection in airport scanners and 
sends a strong message to local poachers, but comes with health risks for humans, not for the 
rhinos.”  
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The fourth proactive measure is fence and gate operations. A large portion of Balule’s borders 
is fenceless, but the western boundary along Route 40 (about 25 kilometers) is controlled by 
registering details of people who drive into the reserve and performing a thorough check of all 
vehicles leaving the reserve (guests, contractors, lodge personnel, landowners, and so on). Self-
drive for guests is allowed, which provides opportunities for illegal activities. Day and night, 
there are regular fence patrols and random checks of vehicles inside the reserve.  
The fifth proactive measure is that because some locals (e.g., lodge staff) set snares and 
(sustenance) poach, a database of all employees on the reserve was created, which led to 
identification cards to be shown at the gate. This allows assessing how many people are 
employed on reserve grounds and where their home communities are. The intelligence network 
uses the database and social media to identify possible high-threat personnel, not for rhino 
poaching as such but for selling information about rhinos’ whereabouts. 
The sixth proactive measure is Research and education. The Research and Voluntourism Camp 
of TransFrontier Africa, a non-profit organization, provides basic accommodation, research, and 
education opportunities for ecologists, conservationists, biologists, and more recently, 
criminologists. The camp also houses the so-called “voluntourists,” interested tourists who stay 
at the camp to learn about rhino conservation and anti-poaching while living in a “big 5” 
environment in an unfenced camp with only solar power. The goal is to raise awareness and 
required funds. 
Finally, the Armed Response Unit within the reserve has adopted some proactive measures to 
address vulnerabilities presented by the lay of the land. Solar lights are installed on trees near 
ports of entry along the river and railway. Vincent Barkas elaborated on a more creative 
measure in which “helium balloons with glow sticks are released so that poachers may mistake 
them for air support or drones and may desists from entering the reserve.” Moreover, decoy 
rhinos are placed at poaching hot spots, and these hot spots are surrounded by camouflaged 
Armed Response Units who quickly arrest those who shoot at the decoys. Poachers may not be 
able to distinguish live rhinos from decoys, especially at night.  
The Balule Rhino Conservation Model encompasses various integrity measures, in addition to 
the abovementioned proactive and threat response measures. There is mandatory polygraph 
testing for all employees involved in an anti-poaching unit, serving both to identify possible 
poacher informants and safeguard against outside allegations of criminal activities by personnel. 
Failing the test or not attending two polygraph appointments can lead to reassignment or 
dismissal. Environmental Monitors carry a GPS tracker during patrols to mark animal, snare, and 
alien vegetation locations and track their patrol route. Carrying this GPS tracker takes away 
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potential suspicion about involvement in poaching activity and holds them accountable. The 
Armed Response Unit and Tactical Unit have radios; thus, the Joint Operations Center can track 
them and listen-in remotely. Rian Ahlers explained that “this is [first and] foremost a safety 
measure for high-threat situations, but can also be used to randomly listen to conversations to 
detect possible poaching information exchange.” Information on patrols and picket sites is 
relayed on a short notice to anti-poaching unit members to ensure that they do not warn 
poachers. Only team leaders have access to green intelligence to coordinate patrols. These 
integrity measures are situational prevention techniques employed to reduce temptation to pass 
on information to poachers, who may then lack the necessary information to determine risks, 
efforts, and rewards and desist from targeting the location where they are applied. 
As presented in Table 1, Clarke’s (1997) original table of situational crime prevention 
techniques is supplemented with the respective proactive, reactive, and integrity measures at 
Balule. Measures that are not in use for ecological reasons (e.g., dehorning) or not (yet) in use for 
financial reasons (e.g., drone surveillance) appear in italics.  
Table 2: Summary of Situational Prevention Techniques 
Increasing Perceived Effort Increasing Perceived Risks Reducing Anticipated 
Rewards 
Removing Excuses 
1. Target hardening 
Rhino collaring 
Intelligence-led patrols 
Reducing target visibility 
from outside a reserve 
5. Entry/exit screening 
Gate operations 
Search procedures for 
vehicles, persons, personal 
items, and luggage 
ID of contractors & service 
providers 
9. Target removal 
De-horning 
Translocation 
13. Rule setting 
Signage of reserve rules at 
gates 
Signage of legal obligations 
concerning poaching at gates 
2. Access control 
Entry and Exit screening 
Identification of persons 
entering and exiting 
Visible & maintained fence 
Employee database 
6. Formal surveillance 
Pro-Track Armed Response 
Teams 
UAV/Drone Surveillance 
Air Support by Helicopter 
and/or light Aircraft 
 
10. Identifying property 
Horn infusions 
Micro-chipping horn 
Rhino collaring 
Ear-notching rhinos 
Signage at fence-line and at 
other ports of entry 
14. Stimulating conscience 
Repeated warning signage 
Spreading Awareness among 
visitors, clients & employees 
Radio/TV adverts to raise 
awareness 
3. Deflecting offenders 
Visible policing 
Fence patrols 
Posting of warning signs 
Randomizing patrol routes & 
times 
Extensive Ecological 
Management/ “Sanctuary in a 
Sanctuary” 
 
7. Surveillance by employees 
Black Mamba Anti-Poaching 
Unit 
Warden Team 
Ad-hoc stop and search of 
vehicles on the reserve 
Reporting of 
vehicles/persons by game 
drives over radio 
communication 
11. Reducing temptation 
Signage along fence 
Horn infusions 
Rotational assignment of 
Armed Response team 
Short-notice deployment to 
picket sites 
GPS-traceable radios for 
patrols 
Polygraph testing of 
employees & security 
providers 
15. Creating Inhibitors 
(formerly: Controlling dis-
inhibitors) 
Environmental education for 
children and adults of local 
communities 
Creating vested interest by 
employment/benefits 
Whistleblower Program 
(possibly with benefits for 
information) 
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Media Publications 
4. Controlling facilitators 
Detection dog 
Gate operations 
Weapon Registration & 
Regulations 
8. Natural surveillance 
Guests, lodge owners, 
Tourism operators, general 
public 
Portable GPS transmitters for 
service provider vehicles 
12. Denying benefits 
Detection dog 
Horn infusions 
De-snaring and emptying 
snares before collected 
New methods of detection, i.e., 
radioisotope marking 
16. Facilitating compliance 
Environmental monitors 
Green Kidz 
Community work via Pro 
Track 
 
6. Discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the Balule Conservation Model  
The multi-stakeholder framework employed at Balule Nature Reserve has several strengths in 
countering poaching threats. First, it includes employees from local, disadvantaged 
communities, creating local ownership, lasting social development, and employment in an 
industry that women previously lacked access to. As one of the few initiatives in the region, it 
actively tries to create social change. Second, the three tiers of the network, while hierarchically 
organized and somewhat dependent on the flow of information among each other, work in a 
largely independent manner toward the common goal of securing the reserve against poaching 
threats. This safeguards the integrity of the model. Third, this framework is tailored to the 
situation and is very adaptable. Albeit sometimes limited by finances, it tackles the most 
imminent threats of poaching for the reserve. This would of course require updates as new 
needs and vulnerabilities arise.  
This governance framework also faces challenges because it is very center-pivot, management-
intensive, and financially strapping. It relies strongly on the leadership, devotion, motivation, 
capacities, and capabilities of the warden of the Olifants West Region. In addition to managing 
the anti-poaching initiative, this warden handles the detection dog and serves as a regional 
warden, managing all of the concerns and duties associated with this position. Furthermore, 
financially speaking, the framework as it is cannot be sustained indefinitely. Tom Tochterman 
explained that during “the first three years, the anti-poaching measures cost 1,140,000 ZAR 
[approximately EUR 74,000 or USD 82,000] in total, which was raised through charities, non-
profit organizations and international donors, [excluding] salaries, fuel, repair and maintenance 
costs.” Donor fatigue may occur, and thus alternative income options and budget cuts are worth 
exploring. Some reserves sell rhinos or other large mammal species for hunting, but with 
dwindling populations this is not a viable option, especially given the potential public relations 
backlash.  
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One of the biggest challenges for rhino conservation lies in law enforcement capabilities. As 
privately owned land, Balule Nature Reserve receives no governmental law enforcement 
support for policing or prosecution. Poaching incidents can be reported at any police station but 
are investigated by one sole unit: the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), also 
called the Hawks. This group investigates corruption, organized crime, and money laundering 
(Corruption Watch South Africa, 2014). Rhino poaching has been given priority crime status and 
falls under the Hawks investigate obligations (Munusamy, 2013). As Craig Spencer notes, “The 
DPCI station closest to Balule is three hours away [in Polokwane], employing four officers.” 
These officers, who each investigate an average of 100 rhino-related offenses per year, are far 
too few to follow-up every rhino poaching incident. Moreover, specific environmental courts no 
longer exist in South Africa. The green court in Hermanus (2003 to 2007) was established as a 
pilot project whose main purpose was to combat abalone poaching. It was very successful and 
had a conviction rate of 85%, often without bail and with prison sentences. It also freed other 
courts from the high number of environmental cases (Gosling 2006). As Kirsty Brebner notes, 
“The court system is overburdened given the high crime rate and prosecutors and judges 
generally lack expertise on environmental crime and harm.” Re-establishing an environmental 
court would match the high priority crime status of rhino poaching and might help to alter the 
risk perception of poachers.  
7. Recommendations for Improving Governance in Balule Nature Reserve and Other 
Anti-poaching Contexts 
The following recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive. We are aware that most depend 
on the presence of sufficient funding. However, we believe these are important to sustain and 
improve the governance model at Balule Nature Reserve.  
To increase the surveillance capacities of the model, the existing measures could be 
supplemented by air support through a drone or lightweight aircraft. This would come with the 
distinct advantage of being able to better coordinate ground forces and reduce incident response 
time. To finance a drone, the idea of making it commercially beneficial to lodges and the reserve 
could be further explored. These entities could be asked to share in costs for purchase and 
maintenance. A drone could, while flying over the reserve, log animals spotted into a database. 
This database could be made available to contributing lodges to improve their game drive 
routes, which would then improve their own profile and attract more guests. Furthermore, a 
drone could aid in performing annual game counts on the reserve, and thereby reducing 
expenditures for helicopter fuel and airtime, as well as pilot remuneration.  
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To reduce expenditures for the anti-poaching initiative, extensive ecological management could 
be implemented. Until South Africa finds a way to adequately prevent, enforce, and investigate 
rhino poaching, and until consumer demand reduction projects in Asia have taken effect and 
resulted in a credible threat reduction, a sanctuary-in-a-sanctuary ecological approach might be 
the most viable short- and mid-term solution. Rhinos currently traverse over 50,000 hectares of 
bush, which makes protection very difficult. With poaching numbers increasing, population 
numbers have fallen so much that finding a mate to reproduce is very unlikely in such a vast 
space. This extensive ecological management requires the use of green intelligence to determine 
the habitat range of the majority of the two rhino species in this reserve. If necessary and 
financially possible, it could mean the relocation of the rest of the populations into the proposed 
sanctuary. The benefit of the sanctuary-in-a-sanctuary method is a higher likelihood of 
reproduction. The smaller fenced area would also the decrease the management and personnel 
required to protect the rhinos. At the moment, patrol efforts are spread out over all of the 
reserve, whereas the sanctuary-in-a-sanctuary approach means definite knowledge of where the 
protected assets are, a shortened response time, and higher chances of arrest, should an 
offender nevertheless decide to try. Overall, this strategy would definitely aid in tilting the cost-
benefit equation of potential offenders toward a disadvantageous outcome. We realize that this 
is a radical ecological intervention, but it may be required to resurrect species numbers from 
near-extinction. This brought the white rhino back from near-extinction in the 1960s (Save the 
Rhino, 2015). One disadvantage of this approach is that rhinos would be less commercially 
available and visible for tourism providers in the reserve. However, this could easily be justified 
and explained to incoming guests, and the lodges’ support for this measure could reinforce their 
claim of engaging in conservation efforts.  
Other situational prevention measures can also increase the factors of anticipated effort, 
perceived risk, and expected reward for potential offenders. To increase guardianship, 
TransFrontier Africa can offer environmental education days for guest visitors living in lodges 
on the reserve, allowing them to gain knowledge of the Balule Rhino Conservation Model. 
Lauren Saad (Ezulwini Lodges), in her interview, highlighted the fact that “most of the clientele 
coming into the reserve do not have adequate knowledge that there is a poaching crisis in South 
Africa.” Educating visitors would increase awareness about the rhino poaching problem and 
warn them not to buy trinkets made of endangered animal products. It would also improve 
TransFrontier Africa’s profile as a provider of environmental education and provide income for 
the Balule Rhino Conservation Model.  
The regime of publishing non-sensitive information on the Balule Rhino Conservation Model 
through various media channels is currently in place and should be continued. Moreover, other 
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anti-poaching initiatives might benefit from implementing this regime because it raises 
awareness about rhino poaching and the non-suitability of the reserve for offending. The result 
is a perception of very high risk and effort. 
The creation of a whistleblower program might also be useful for Balule and other anti-poaching 
contexts. The creation of the program requires sufficient resources for its organization as well as 
for managing and verifying the information received. In addition, it might be useful to offer 
rewards to people who provide information about offenders and planned offenses. Although this 
would require additional money and time, the gathered information is likely to benefit 
intelligence-led policing in the reserve. 
Another situational crime prevention measure that Balule Nature Reserve itself could consider 
pursuing is the mandatory outfitting of contractors and delivery vehicles with portable GPS 
transmitters. This would decrease the inherent risk these actors pose to the reserve’s security 
profile.  
Furthermore, the signs at the ports of entry could be improved, by outlining the regulations 
applicable to poaching. This would inform all incoming persons of obligations, aiding in 
removing excuses and the permissibility of the offense.  
Lastly, if legally feasible, denying visitors the right to bring weapons into the reserve would aid 
in controlling facilitators of rhino poaching. At the very least, reserves could consider mandatory 
declaration and registration of weapons at entry gates.  
8. Conclusion 
This case study of the Balule Rhino Conservation Model aimed to improve our understanding of 
the crime of rhino poaching in this location, and analyzed whether and how situational 
prevention measures can alter the cost-benefit equation for potential offenders. It also 
considered how the sociopolitical and economic context affects both the crime itself and its 
governance.  
In the larger scheme of transnational environmental crime, this initiative is buying time in the 
factual absence of governmental regulation and enforcement. The initiative is saving rhinos. On 
the other hand, South Africa is contemplating legalizing rhino horn sales in an attempt to out-
design the crime and avoid proceeds of wildlife crime by financing other international crimes 
such as terrorism (Foley, 2013; Kuhumbu & Halliday, 2014). The size of public and private 
stockpiles is unknown, as is the demand for rhino horn. Some say that the proceeds of stockpile 
sales will benefit wildlife conservation, whereas others say that it will increase demand, as it did 
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for the legalization of ivory (Endangered Wildlife Trust, 2013; Traffic 2013). By considering the 
fact that South Africa, at present, largely fails to sufficiently regulate existing domestic trade 
options, the suggestion of a highly regulated legal international trade scheme appears neither 
promising nor realistic.  
While we examined the situational make-up of anticipated effort, perceived risk, and expected 
reward as well as the intricacies of the crime of rhino poaching, we realize that the anti-poaching 
initiatives have to try and impact various fronts at once. Legislative shortcomings seem to be 
adding to the low-risk perception of potential offenders. The lack of visible law enforcement 
efforts around and in private nature reserves is increasing the perception of a relatively low 
level of effort required to commit crime. The fact that the demand for rhino horn persists fuels 
the anticipation of a high reward. These are problems that one anti-poaching initiative alone 
cannot combat. Common sense informed the Balule Rhino Conservation Model about which 
measures to put in place to change the equation of risk, effort, and reward for the offender, 
inadvertently answering to the situational crime prevention theory. In essence, they intended to 
make this reserve the most undesirable, miserable place for potential offenders, and dissuade 
them from offending at this location without employing a general shoot-to-kill policy. Future 
studies should examine whether and how the measures should change over time. 
Most importantly, these situational measures, i.e., reactive and proactive, are embedded within a 
conservation model that explicitly aims to change the social and cultural context. As a 
multifaceted conservation model, it provides research opportunities for various disciplines such 
as criminology, sociology, governance, law, tourism and hospitality studies, conservation, and 
ecology. Employing women from disadvantaged communities increases guardian capacities of 
the reserve. This offers a stable income from wildlife conservation, creates an opportunity for 
education, and fosters structural and cultural change.  
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